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In response to the Great Recession of 2008, many national governments implemented fiscal stimuli packages in 2009 and 2010 to prevent further declines in aggregate demand and to jump start their economic recovery. Where subnational governments responded with fiscal contraction, as in the United States, the impact was muted; where states/provinces also expanded expenditures, as in China and India, the impact was magnified. Increases in recurrent expenditure, which were made in Brazil and India, acted as short-term stimulants; additional public investment, as in China, appears to have had a more lasting impact on growth. Large developing countries typically exhibit high interregional inequality in levels of development and global integration, resulting in differential magnitude and timing of the crisis impact. For example, coastal states in India were affected more severely and quickly This paper is a product of the Operations and Strategy Unit, Development Economics Vice Presidnecy. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at sfardoust1@gmail.com and vjravishankar@gmail.com. than landlocked states; revenue moved in opposite directions in the two types of state in 2009. Where fiscal stress varies widely across subnational entities, central transfers alone cannot prevent pro-cyclicality of subnational fiscal response to a recession. There is need for flexibility in subnational borrowing within a sustainable fiscal framework. Many Indian states were able to maintain or accelerate their spending thanks to the additional borrowing permitted in 2009 and 2010. In comparison, limited borrowing capacity and lack of flexibility in federal grants restricted the contribution of Brazilian states to fiscal stimulus. Legal prohibition of subnational borrowing induced China's provinces to finance additional investments through extra-budgetary borrowing by nongovernment entities, with significant fiscal risks on account of contingent liabilities.
Introduction
The global economic crisis of 2008-09, with its epicenter in the United States, has been characterized as "one of the broadest, deepest, and most complex crises afflicting the world since the Great Depression" (Didier, Helvia, and Schmukler 2010) . It resulted in a sharp deceleration of economic growth in both developed and developing countries. Between 2008 and 2010, emerging economies suffered declines in gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates that were as steep as in advanced economies; their recovery was quicker and stronger, however. Most low-income countries were less affected (World Bank and IMF 2010) .
The crisis fundamentally changed the landscape in the global economy. The immediate outlook is affected by the downside risk that the euro area will fall into recession. Recently released forecasts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank warn that global recovery remains fragile and that many advanced economies are likely to face a long of period of slow growth, high unemployment, and significant excess capacity in key economic sectors as they face large fiscal deficits and high debt levels (IMF 2012; World Bank 2012) . At the same time, the world economy is undergoing massive shifts, underpinned by the rapid rise of emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India.
In 2011, emerging and developing economies as a group accounted for nearly 50 percent of world GDP (in purchasing power parity [PPP] terms), up from 35 percent in the mid-1980s.
They accounted for nearly 70 percent of world economic growth. Going forward, their weight in global production, trade, investment, and finance is likely to continue to rise. These economies, including their subnational governments, will play an increasingly important role in the global economy.
National governments in most developed and developing countries responded to the global crisis with countercyclical fiscal and monetary policies. They adopted measures to expand aggregate demand for goods and services by increasing net government expenditure, at the cost of higher fiscal deficits and public debt, and kept interest rates in check through accommodative monetary policy, at the cost of increase in inflation in some countries.
However, national efforts at stimulating economic growth were partly annulled by expenditure contraction, tax increases, or both at the subnational level in some federal countries. The negative impact of the crisis on state and local government finances in the United States was large and potentially long lasting (Box 1). In general, subnational fiscal outcomes in large federal countries varied, depending on inherited levels of debt, historically evolved fiscal behavior, and the rules governing borrowing by subnational governments.
Box 1 Working at Cross-Purposes: Intergovernmental Disharmony in the United States
Subnational fiscal policy in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis was pro-cyclical in many advanced economies. The problem was especially pronounced in the United States.
While the federal government cut taxes, increased spending, and expanded its deficit to stimulate aggregate demand, states cut a broad range of spending items. Growing political pressure on the federal government to reduce its fiscal deficit means that states and municipalities will receive less federal financial aid in the future. Moreover, despite some recovery in revenues following moderate economic recovery, state and local tax collections are projected to be weak to moderate due to the lagged response to falling house prices. These trends imply additional discretionary expenditure cuts, particularly as entitlement programs (e.g. Medicare/Medicaid) continue to rise rapidly. Hence the procyclical behavior of sub-national finances is likely to continue.
Source: Jonas 2012 and authors.
Recent research (Canuto and Liu 2010a,b) discusses the pressures on subnational finance arising from the global crisis and from the debt created by subnational units through special-5 purpose vehicles (SPVs) to finance infrastructure investments, which carry "inherent" risks as they often circumvent borrowing limits and create contingent liabilities.
Regression analysis using time series data through the 1990s for seven large federal countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, and the United States) reveals that subnational government finance is overwhelmingly pro-cyclical, implying that the behavior of state governments in the United States is not an exception but the general rule (Rodden and Wibbels 2010). Only Canada was found to be engaged in harmonized expenditure smoothing in that decade.
In the recent crisis, other countries also harmonized their policies. China, with its combination of high savings and large fiscal space, provides an important example of a countercyclical subnational response (Ter-Minassian and Fedelino 2010; Fardoust, Lin, and Luo 2012) . Expansionary subnational government spending played a key role in strengthening the overall impact of the stimulus and sustaining economic growth. A less dramatic example is India, where the central government eased borrowing constraints on state governments in 2009 and 2010.
Global economic growth recovered in 2010 but slowed in 2011. Serious concerns have emerged that the relatively fast-growing economies are also beginning to experience a downturn. In view of these trends, the IMF's 2012 assessments recommend a gradual fiscal adjustment, cautioning governments against drastic cuts in their deficits and spending, lest they exacerbate the contraction. This advice is based on the conclusion drawn from empirical studies that the "fiscal multiplier" is especially large during times of crisis.
Over the past decade, subnational spending as a share of government spending increased in many federal countries (Ter-Minassian and Fedelino 2010) . The change has important implications for the size of fiscal multipliers and their impact on the national economy and for policy/institutional reform for improved coordination across government levels in implementing a harmonized crisis response. This paper is a follow-up to a research project carried out at the World Bank on the macroeconomic impact of the Great Recession in developing countries. The results of that project, which focused on the macroeconomic events of the 2008-09 crisis and national 6 policy responses in 10 developing countries, are reported in Nabli (2010). The focus here is on the policy responses by subnational governments in India and a comparative analysis of the three largest developing economies (Brazil, China, and India) . This paper reviews recent research and draws on the lessons learned from practical experience in advising policy makers in subnational governments in developing countries to examine the question of subnational fiscal response to the recent crisis.
Conceptual Framework
The widening of government deficits during a period of economic downturn is generally the result of two sets of factors: (a) automatic effects on revenues and expenditures (known as automatic stabilizers, because they counteract the decline in demand) and (b) discretionary countercyclical policy measures including tax cuts and public spending increases to stimulate aggregate demand. Revenues automatically slow down or decline when economic activity slows; some expenditures, such as unemployment benefits and other demand-driven social programs, automatically rise when employment slows or declines. The second set of factors is the outcome of deliberate fiscal policy response on the part of governments at the central, state/provincial, and local levels. The existence of fiscal rules and the stance of monetary policy (high or low interest rates) also affect the size of national and subnational deficits.
The size of fiscal multipliers depends on the composition of fiscal expansion and the initial conditions of the economy (box 2). There is a broad consensus in the literature that fiscal expansion through higher spending has larger multiplier effects than expansion through a tax cut, because additional disposable income from tax cuts may not be fully spent. Some portion is saved, depending on the income level of the beneficiary of the tax cut; the additional saving may not create additional investment demand in a poor investment climate.
An increase in government capital spending tends to have a larger multiplier effect than increases in recurring expenditures (Ducanes and others 2006) . Within recurrent government spending, the multiplier effect may be smaller for salary expenditures than for the purchase of goods and services (because employees may save part of their additional income). If a large share of the government wage bill goes to clerical or midlevel staff with a high propensity to spend additional income on consumer durables-as, for example, in India 7 during 2009-an upward revision of salary scales could have a significant impact on private consumption demand in the short run.
Box 2 How Large Is the Fiscal Multiplier?
The effect of fiscal expansion on output is referred to as the fiscal multiplier. It is measured by the unit change in output or GDP per unit change in government expenditure, other determinants of output remaining unchanged:
Where F = fiscal multiplier, Y = income or GDP, and G = government expenditure. Large standard errors of estimation have prevented researchers from pinning down precise estimates of the value of F. Recent estimates range from negative to more than one (Spilimbergo and others 2008) . Calculating the fiscal multiplier is difficult because there is no simple way to control the "fiscal experiment" (Barro and Redlick 2011; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2009)-that is, to separate the impact of changes in government spending from changes in other variables that simultaneously affect changes in income, through various channels.
Estimates of fiscal multipliers depend on the methodology, period, initial conditions, and controls applied. Study of the experience in the United States suggests that deficit-financed state government spending has a lower multiplier than windfall-financed spending, because deficit-financed state spending tends to crowd out private consumption and investment (referred to as Ricardian equivalence). However, in periods of stagnant or declining consumption and investment demand, deficit-financed government spending does not crowd out private demand. The multiplier is therefore larger than during boom times.
A survey of empirical evidence suggests that for the 2008-09 stimuli by the G20, the low set of multipliers was 0.3 for revenue, 0.5 for capital spending, and 0.3 for other spending; the high set of multipliers was 0.6 for revenue, 1.8 for capital spending, and 1.0 for other spending (Spilimbergo, Symansky, and Schindler 2009) . For a sample of 102 developing countries, the one-year government spending multiplier resulting from borrowing from official creditors is estimated to be about 0.4 (Kraay 2012) . In emerging markets, where fiscal space is large, the safety net shallow, and infrastructure deficits great, the effects of 8 fiscal policy are greater than in advanced economies (Aizeman and Jinjarak 2010).
However, the cumulative (multi-period) multipliers tend to be smaller for emerging markets than for advanced economies as the positive impact of an increase in government expenditures on GDP tends to fall off quickly (Ilzetki, Mendoza, and Vegh, 2011) . Also, the size of public spending multipliers tends to be much smaller (zero or even negative) in highly indebted countries due to crowding out of private investment.
Source : Fardoust, Lin and Luo (2012) , and review of literature by authors.
Some researchers find that expenditure on infrastructure investment and transfers targeted at the poor have the largest fiscal multipliers among all categories of government spending (Horton, Kumar, and Mauro 2009) . Other researchers point to the inherently medium-to longer-term nature of infrastructure investments. Implementation takes time, and due processes need to be followed in appraising and selecting investment projects.
Government revenues at all levels generally follow a procyclical pattern: they automatically grow faster during economic upswings and slower during downturns. For a particular subnational government, revenue growth depends on both (a) its own tax revenue base, related to GDP within its region, and (b) the transfer of resources from the central government, in the form of a share of central taxes, central grants, or both.
The distribution and timing of the impact of the economic slowdown on revenues depends on the division of taxing powers between the levels of government. In countries where states/provinces rely mainly on their own revenues (for example, the United States), subnational government revenues could vary because of differences in regional economic growth. Where subnational governments rely largely on central transfers (for example, Mexico), the revenue impact is more uniform across regions. In this case, subnational government revenues are driven mainly by GDP at the national level and its impact on central revenues.
The situation is more complicated when there is large variation across subnational governments within a country in terms of their dependence on central transfers (for example, Brazil, India, and to a lesser extent, China). In the countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), subnational government revenues react later to economic cycles than do the revenues of the central government, with a lag of about one year (Blochliger and others 2010) .
Total resources available to be spent by a state/provincial government are the sum of its total revenues and net borrowing capacity. Whether a government spends to its full capacity, however, depends on its constitutional mandate to spend on specified goods and services and the incentives governing its spending decisions, including fiscal responsibility laws, borrowing rules, and rewards for fiscal prudence. Although the subnational government
Box 3 What Determines Subnational Government Spending?
The structure and institutional framework of subnational finances differ markedly from national government finance in at least two important ways. First, because expenditures are more decentralized than revenues in many countries, most subnational governments rely on intergovernmental transfers, revenue sharing, or both for a significant part of their total revenues. Second, many subnational governments operate under balanced budget rules and face strict limits on borrowing from domestic or external sources (external sources generally come through the central government). In general, a subnational government spends in pursuit of developmental outcomes in its own jurisdiction and to contribute to national economic growth. It may or may not link its own spending with output growth in its own jurisdiction. Because subnational economies are open to trade within the country, a state/province's own multiplier (∂Y i /∂G i ) will not be large, and cross-multipliers (∂Y i /∂G j , where i is different from j) will be significant. Irrespective of the size of its own multiplier, a second-tier government in a large federal country is interested in achieving its targeted ∂G i for developmental reasons.
Let R denote government revenue, G government expenditure, and FD the fiscal deficit. For a subnational government that faces a limit FD* on its deficit because of its borrowing constraint and seeks to spend a desired or budgeted G*,
The fiscal policy response of subnational governments will thus be procyclical during a downturn as long as government revenues are procyclical, unless (a) there are additional compensating transfers from the central government, (b) withdrawals from contingency (rainy day) funds, or (c) adequate flexibility in the borrowing rules for subnational governments to respond to cycles within sustainable limits.
a. The condition is that R*-R, the revenue shortfall, is less than FD*-(E*-R*), the additional borrowing capacity, which translates into R-R*>E*-FD*-R*. Dropping R* and reversing the order yields E*<R+FD*.
Source: Authors.
budgets a certain level of expenditure based on estimated revenue and a borrowing target, it will not be able to meet its spending target if revenue falls short of the budget estimate by more than the room it has for borrowing in excess of its budget target (Box 3).
Aggregate subnational debt in 2010 was about 16 percent of GDP in Brazil and 27 percent in both China and India. The scope of subnational governments contributing to countercyclical fiscal policy is determined by the level of debt and interest rates facing individual subnational governments. Some governments may be able to contribute more than others to aggregate fiscal expansion. Short-term stabilization as well as the pursuit of medium-and long-term goals require that governments at least avoid unplanned cuts in developmental expendituresomething that could be considered a minimum target for subnational fiscal policy during an economic downturn.
The Global Crisis and Subnational Finances
After a decline of about 4 percent in 2009, real GDP grew in the advanced economies, by 3.0 percent in 2010 and 1.6 percent in 2011 (table 1) . Emerging economies, which contracted by more than 5 percent in 2009, rebounded almost to pre-crisis rates of growth in the following two years.
The strong recovery in emerging economies resulted in multiple growth poles, which helped support the global recovery. This rebound in large part reflected these countries' relatively healthy initial economic conditions, which allowed them to implement countercyclical 11 policies. The impact was magnified in large federal countries where subnational governments were also enabled to enhance their spending.
The crisis hit most developing countries through a decline in demand for exports, a freeze in credit, and a slowing or reversal of capital inflows. The most visible shock to emerging economies was through the export channel. As the U.S. economy came to a standstill, exports in several emerging economies collapsed. In general, tradable goods and services suffered significant deceleration or decline; nontradable commodities were affected much less. As a result, the more integrated the economy of a country with the global market, the greater the negative impact of the crisis on its growth.
The impact on output was most acute in Mexico, which is highly dependent on the U.S. market and has a large share of exports in its GDP. In Brazil, growth rebounded quickly, partly because of its more diversified production base and export destinations and the large share of domestic consumption in aggregate demand. China and India also recovered quickly, assisted by counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies. However, the recovery has not been sustained either in advanced or emerging economies, with 2012 growth rates projected well below pre-crisis levels (table 1). An empirical exercise undertaken for India by the Reserve Bank of India (2012) estimates that short-term impact multipliers for current and total expenditures are relatively small (about 0.5). In contrast, the long-term multiplier associated with public infrastructure investment is estimated to be large (about 2.5). These are econometric estimates using the vector auto regression ( 2 A VAR model estimates the impact of one variable on another assuming that every variable is a linear function of its own past (lagged values) and the past patterns of all other variables, unlike structural models that are based on the formulation of a specific structure of relationships based on economic theory. (table 2) . However, economic growth in 2010 and 2011 was no stronger in advanced economies than emerging economies, suggesting that fiscal stimuli may have worked more efficiently in emerging economies, in the sense that recovery was accomplished with smaller fiscal expansion than in the advanced economies. The movement in the general government fiscal balance is the result of combined net public spending at the national and subnational levels. The combined deficit peaked in 2009 in almost all countries, after which there was some fiscal contraction. Expansionary fiscal stance could not be sustained in most cases, either because of the pro-cyclical behavior of subnational finances or because of already high fiscal deficit and debt levels before the crisis.
The capacity for further fiscal stimuli is related to the level of public debt and the need to contain it within sustainable limits. Emerging and lower-income countries are less debt stressed than advanced economies, and China is significantly less debt stressed than other emerging economies (table 3) . However, this assessment needs to be reviewed in the light of full information, not yet available, on the considerable contingent liabilities of national and provincial governments in China, which are excluded from table 3. 
Comparison of Brazil, China, and India
This section compares the experience of three of the largest developing countries, Brazil, China, and India. It begins with a brief overview of the framework of fiscal federalism. It then describes how the global crisis affected each country and how each country responded to the crisis, focusing on the role of subnational fiscal policy.
Framework of Fiscal Federalism
Subnational governments have significant spending responsibilities in all three countries.
However, taxing powers vary a great deal, as does the degree of dependence on central transfers. There are also marked differences in the political framework affecting the relations between the national and subnational governments.
The fact that subnational governments undertake the bulk of consolidated government spending is sometimes mistakenly interpreted as a high degree of decentralization in China. The 1993-94 reforms in China attempted to move away from ad hoc negotiated intergovernmental transfers toward a more rules-based and somewhat more transparent mechanism. In particular, a system of general purpose grants was introduced aimed at fiscal 3 Based on data provided in Table 3 Brazil was most affected through the credit channel. The disruption in the international credit markets led to a drop in investment and GDP contracted in 2009. In India, the global crisis occurred after a downturn in the domestic investment cycle had already begun; as a result, the negative impact on growth was magnified.
The immediate impact on growth was most severe in Brazil; the impact over three to four years has been equally severe in India (figure 2).
Figure 2 Real Annual Changes in Gross Domestic Product in Brazil, China, and India, 2003-12
Source: Table 1 above. The growth deceleration would have been much steeper without any fiscal stimulus, especially in China and to a lesser extent in India. Private consumption demand proved very resilient in Brazil; as a result, aggregate demand was less of a binding a constraint than the availability of credit.
During the pre-crisis boom period of 2003-07, economic growth in both China and India was driven largely by investment demand and export demand. By contrast, the leading driver of economic growth in Brazil was private consumption demand. In such conditions, the expansion of public consumption, with increases in salaries of government employees spurring private consumption, was effective in spurring a quick recovery in economic growth. Note: Real growth rates were calculated using an implicit GDP deflator.
They included investments of about Y1.2 trillion by the central government and Y2.8 trillion of supporting investment projects and programs by provincial and county governments and nongovernmental entities, financed by loans from domestic banks. Infrastructure development, post disaster reconstruction, and housing guarantees made up almost 75 percent of the stimulus package.
The fiscal balances reflect only transactions on budget; they omit public investments financed by the domestic banking system off budget, a large component in China. The increase in expenditure on budget was heavily concentrated at the subnational level (table 5) .
Among subnational expenditures, the steepest increase in 2009 was for transport infrastructure, followed by "agriculture, water, and forestry." The two categories accounted for 36 percent of the increase in subnational expenditures. Health and education spending accounted for 22 percent. In India, pre-crisis fiscal stimulation measures-including increases in the food and fertilizer subsidy, a central pay hike, a farm debt waiver, and a national rural employment guarantee The federal fiscal deficit narrowed in 2010 by 2 percentage points of GDP, while the deficit of subnational governments expanded by only 0.4 percentage point. States' outstanding debt rose but less than the permitted limit due to the time interval needed to contract and disburse a loan after the increase in borrowing room is allowed.
The composition of fiscal stimulus was similar in India and Brazil, dominated by current expenditure, including salary payments. In contrast, infrastructure investment dominated in China.
Economic growth recovered in 2010 in all three countries after having declined in 2009. In Brazil, the uptick was caused largely by the prompt monetary policy response to extend credit through public financial institutions to make up for the collapse in private credit flows.
However, the recovery has been short lived, as economic growth decelerated during 2011
and 2012, more steeply in India and Brazil than in China (see figure 2 ).
The multiplier effect of fiscal expansion was largest in China, where the investment share was highest. This is consistent with the empirical finding that public investment expenditure has stronger and longer-lasting impact on economic growth than recurrent expenditure, as
shown by recent estimates of fiscal multipliers for China, India, the G7 and G20 groups of countries (table 8) . It should be noted that size of multiplier tends to be sensitive to the level of debt, with fiscal multiplier being close to zero or even negative in highly indebted countries (Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Vegh, 2012) .
Recent analysis points to two factors that contributed to the unusually large multiplier effect of China's fiscal stimulus: "(a) the large marginal effects of government spending on investment, consumption, and in medium to long run on net exports and (b) the strong countercyclical nature of subnational government expenditures" (Fardoust, Lin, and Luo 2012, page 12) . The fiscal expansion took place largely at the subnational level in China and India; subnational fiscal response was pro-cyclical in Brazil. In sum, the experience of China, India, and Brazil in responding to the global crisis of 2008 presents a mixed picture and raises various country-specific concerns. China scores high in terms of the composition of the fiscal stimulus and its multiplier effect on the economy; it scores low in terms of prudent financial management, with excessive reliance on off-budget domestic bank financing. India and Brazil score low in terms of the composition of fiscal stimulus and its (low) investment content. India scores high in enabling state governments to contribute to the stimulus within the limits of a sustainable fiscal framework. Slack credit demand from the private sector was a factor that enabled Indian states to access domestic bank credit, which was a binding constraint for the states in Brazil.
Although Brazil scores high in terms of protecting real spending levels on social programs in The landlocked states have a disproportionately large share of agriculture and production of nontradable commodities in their output (where "nontradable" refers to India's external trade). Growth in these states is driven more by national demand than by export demand.
8 The eight major coastal states are Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Odisha (Orissa), Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal. They account for 47 percent of the population and 58 percent of national GDP. The six major landlocked states are Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. They account for 40 percent of the population and 27 percent of national GDP. Central grants declined 3 percent; the combined effect was a real increase in central transfers of 9 percent, a larger increase than the change in real GDP. However, the real rate of growth in central transfers slowed, falling sharply from 14.5 percent before the crisis to 1.4 percent after the crisis in the major coastal states (table 11) , which are also the states that suffered more from the declines in own revenues.
Eight of India's 14 major states, including both coastal and landlocked states, managed to maintain or accelerate their expenditure growth (table 12) This adjustment contributed to consumption-led economic growth in the short run.
In Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha (formerly Orissa), Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal, accelerated total expenditure growth was achieved through significant expansion of the fiscal deficit. These states used the additional borrowing room granted to all states in 2009 and 2010. The 12th Finance Commission had recommended that states contain their deficits to no 9 The monthly salary of central and state employees in public administration and publicly funded social services consists of two major parts. "Basic pay" is adjusted once every 10 years; the "dearness allowance" is enhanced annually, linked to consumer price movements and absorbed into basic pay once every decade. The decadal adjustments are based on the recommendations of a central pay commission that is constituted anew every decade. It submits its report to Parliament. (Table 12) . The key findings of this case study can be summarized as follows:
• Coastal and landlocked states in India experienced differential impact of the global crisis, with revenue moving in opposite directions in 2008 and 2009.
• In the coastal states, central transfers did not compensate for the significant deceleration of revenues. Nevertheless, the majority of states were able to maintain or accelerate their spending growth, thanks to the additional borrowing room permitted by the center in 2009 and 2010.
• States contributed 44 percent of the increase in the level of general government spending between 2008 and 2010.
• The increase in public spending, at both the central and state level, was predominantly on current expenditures (salaries, subsidies, and social programs).
• Public investment rose by less than a quarter of the steep decline in private corporate investment.
• The impact of fiscal stimulus on the economy was significant but short-lived.
• National economic growth is estimated to have fallen below 5 percent in 2012, for the first time in a decade.
• Despite a temporary rise in the fiscal deficit of both the center and the states in 2009 and 2010, debt and debt-servicing ratios are falling, thanks to high inflation and negative real interest rates.
Policy Lessons
China and India demonstrate that subnational governments can make a positive contribution to countercyclical fiscal policy where there is room to temporarily loosen their borrowing constraints, on or off budget. Brazil demonstrates the converse-that where subnational governments have limited borrowing room or access to credit, the fiscal response of subnational governments is likely to be pro-cyclical, dampening national attempts to stimulate aggregate demand and economic growth.
An important lesson from the experience of China is that a large fiscal stimulus implemented in a coordinated manner, with all levels of government aligned to a single plan, can have a significant positive impact on both subnational and national economic growth. On the negative side, the financing of subnational spending through off-budget borrowing has raised the fiscal risk associated with inadequately accounted contingent liabilities. The risk would be manageable as long as economic growth remains high but not otherwise. With lending and investment driven mainly by government policy directives, there is also a concern that the economic rationale underpinning investment decisions may be compromised. An important lesson for China is that it is more prudent to rely on budget financing than on off budget loans should another round of stimulus become necessary. There is a case for introducing some room for provincial governments to borrow directly on budget, along with improving financial management and accountability at that level, including adequate monitoring of contingent liabilities.
In India, the fiscal stimulus that was implemented in 2008-10 was less successful than China's, with its impact not extending beyond 2010. The increase in public spending, at both the federal and state level, was predominantly on the current account; public investment rose by less than a quarter of the steep decline in private corporate investment. The multiplier effect was short-lived as a result.
An important policy issue for India is the need to allow greater flexibility in controlling the growth of the public salary bill, in order to create fiscal space for stepping up public investment. There is a need to move away from the archaic system of adjusting civil service salaries once every 10 years, which acts like a periodic exogenous shock that squeezes fiscal space for capital spending and non-salary recurring expenditures.
A deficit-financed fiscal stimulus is not easily implementable in India if such a necessity were to emerge in the near future. The national government is already on a tight fiscal consolidation path, as are the majority of states, in line with the recommendations of the 13th
Finance Commission concerning the fiscal framework during 2010-15. Looking forward, the focus has to be on the major pending reforms to expand fiscal space, such as by (i) introducing the proposed goods and services tax (GST), which would expand the tax net, (ii) rationalizing user fees in selected sectors, and (iii) rationalizing expenditures such as subsidies and centrally sponsored programs that have outlived their utility.
In Brazil, the resilience of domestic consumption demand has been a distinct advantage in weathering the global crisis. This paper focuses on the fiscal policy response to the global recession. Subnational governments also have important responsibilities toward medium-term development goals, which need to be protected at all times. China's provinces need to enhance spending on social programs in order to reduce the need for rural households to save for unforeseen shocks, thereby increasing their propensity to consume. Indian states are responsible for a large part of the deficit in irrigation, road transport infrastructure, public health, and education. In addition to infrastructure, human capital, and environmental needs, subnational governments in most developing countries also need to consider demographic factors. In both China and Brazil, the rapid rise in the average age of the population over the coming decades implies additional fiscal pressures over the medium to longer term.
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Given the expected increase in subnational spending requirements, it is essential for federal countries to establish mechanisms for periodic review and revision of their systems of intergovernmental resource-sharing and transfers. India's Finance Commission, which is constituted afresh once every five years to assess the situation and recommend the formula for tax-sharing and transfers over the next five years, has some useful lessons for China, where ad hoc earmarked transfers and inadequate fiscal equalization remain major problems.
In Brazil the pro-cyclicality of transfers and the constraints on states' access to the credit market together call for a review of fiscal federalism arrangements, so as to refine them to enable SNGs meet their expenditure obligations in the future.
